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2000’li yılların başında yaşadığı iki ciddi kriz sonrasında Türkiye 
bankacılık sektörü adına bir dizi radikal reform tesis etmiştir. Bu 
çalışma, tespit edebildiğimiz kadarıyla söz konusu bankacılık 
reformlarının reel ekonomi üzerindeki taşma etkilerini ampirik olarak 
araştırmayı deneyen ilk çalışmadır. Endüstri düzeyinde veriler 
vasıtasıyla 1998-2003 periyodunun incelendiği çalışmada farkların 
farkı kullanılmıştır. Çalışmanın sonuçları, yeniden yapılandırma 
reformlarının bankalara bağımlı büyük firmalar üzerinde olumlu 
taşma etkileri olduğunu, küçük firmaların kendilerini bankacılık 
sisteminde hayata geçirilen katı önlemlerin sebep olduğu sonuçlardan 
korumakta yetersiz olduklarını ve bankalar üzerindeki bu sıkı 
denetimin, bankalara bağımlı firmaların dış finansmana erişimini 
kısıtladığını ortaya koymaktadır. Söz konusu tüm bulgular politika 
yapıcılar açısından önemli sonuçlar barındırmaktadır.  
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Following the two severe crises in the beginnings of 2000s, Turkey had 
to implement a radical set of reforms in her banking sector. This study 
is the first attempt to empirically investigate the spillover effects of 
these reforms on the real economy. Using industry-level data for the 
period 1998-2003, the study employs a difference-in-differences 
approach. The set of findings indicate that the restructuring reforms 
had positive spillovers for bank-dependent large firms, small firms 
were not able to shield themselves from the stricter measures over 
banks restricted bank-dependent firms to access external funds. All 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reform activities in financial sectors -in the banking sector more particularly- have quite 
strong spillover effects for the real economy. Any resulting change in the way that various 
types of firms finance themselves has also implications for the entire economy. For instance, 
both theoretical suggestions and empirical findings imply that improved regulations over 
banks reduce bank lending. Reduction in bank loans is more destructive for small firms due 
to the fact that the small firms are dependent on banks as financial intermediaries and bank 
loans constitute their major external funding source.  
In the beginnings of 2000s, Turkey had to implement a radical reform in her banking sector 
following two severe crises, one in November 2000 and the other one in February 2001. The 
first crisis could be seen as a “liquidity crisis”, and according to Onis (2009:1) it could have 
been prevented if the Central Bank of Turkey infused more liquidity into the system. The 
banking crisis of February 2001, on the other hand, had far dramatic consequences. 
Economy-wide unemployment increased from 6.5 percent to 10.3 percent. The banking 
sector had to cut its work force by a considerable amount. According to Onis (2009:1), the 
second crisis showed the structural problems inherent in the Turkish economy and all 
sections of the society were negatively affected by the crisis.  
In order to reduce the negative impact of the crises, the “Transition to Stronger Economy 
Program” was started to be implemented in 15th of May 2001. The Program aimed at 
eliminating risks and problems that could not be resolved, and establishing stability in the 
banking industry via financial and operational restructuring. The main pillar of the program 
was the “Banking Sector Restructuring Program”, which envisaged financial and operational 
restructuring of public banks, and transforming the fragile private banking system into a 
healthy structure. The program also included provisions for increasing the effectiveness of 
screening and monitoring in the banking industry. In this regard, stricter measures for 
ensuring the quality of Turkish banks’ assets were adopted. For instance, the amount of 
credits given by a bank to a specific holding could not exceed 25 % of that bank’s equity 
capital.    
In the realm of operational restructuring, significant changes were made. The number of 
branches of the public banks was reduced. The top management of the public banks had to 
report to a joint administrative board, which was also responsible for preparing public banks 
for privatization. For the banks transferred to the State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF),1 
their numbers of branches were reduced via mergers and acquisitions. The rest of the private 
banks rationalized their numbers of branch and personnel to increase their cost effectiveness. 
Because of restructuring in the Turkish banking sector, the number of banks decreased from 
72 in June 2001 to 50 in December 2003. Similarly, the number of branches and the number 
of employees fell from 7,530 and 155,299 in June 2001 to 6,087 and 124,030 in December 
2003, respectively (Küçükbıçakçı, 2004:1),2 
Thus, the reforms and restructuring of the banking market in Turkey after 2000-2001 crisis 
included, inter alia, stronger capital structures, superior risk management and supervision, 
improved screening by authorities.  These reforms and measures, in turn, resulted in a 
healthy, efficient and strong banking sector in Turkey (Steinherr et al., 2004:1; Yayla et al., 
2008:9; Öncü & Aktaş, 2007:247; Özkan-Günay et al., 2013:80), However, even though the 
effects of these restructuring reforms on the Turkish banking system is analyzed and 
identified, there has been no empirical investigation of the spillover effects of these 
                                                        
1Between 1999 and mid-2001 a total of 16 banks were taken over by SDIF (Damar, 2009). After a financial and 
operational restructuring process, which included the elimination of problematic credits, reductions in deposit 
rates, decreases in foreign exchange positions, and came at a cost $21.4 billion, these banks were liquidated 
(Damar, 2007). 
2The roots of overexpansion in the Turkish banking sector and the process of bank restructuring in Turkey is 
explained in detail in Damar (2007). 
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restructuring reforms on the real economy. This study is the first attempt to measure the real 
effects of these post-crisis bank restructuring reforms in Turkey. This, Issue deserves 
attention due to the fact that banks are the main sources of external finance for Turkish 
firms, and spillovers from the reforms, if any, will have consequences for industrial activities 
and economic growth in Turkey.  
In order to gauge the real effects of these post-crisis bank restructuring reforms in Turkey, 
the current study employs a difference-in-differences approach. The identifying assumption 
is that firms that are more dependent on banks for external funding are affected more heavily 
after the bank restructuring in Turkey. Stated differently, firms that are more dependent on 
bank loans should respond more disproportionately to bank restructuring reforms.  
The first set of empirical results indicate that the average number of employees in large firms 
that operate in bank-dependent industries increased significantly following the banking 
reforms. This finding could be interpreted as that bank-dependent large firms did not have to 
downsize themselves and they sustained their growth prospects. Secondly, there is weak 
evidence that the share of industry sales made by bank-dependent small firms was reduced 
during the post-restructuring period. Thirdly, an increase in the share of equities to liabilities 
in the post-restructuring period for bank-dependent industries is reported. This finding 
reveals that bank-dependent firms are restricted in terms of accessing to external funds, and 
they switch their funding sources from external funds to internal funds. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: the next section summarizes the existing literature on the 
real effects of banks’ negative financial conditions in addition to the mitigating real effects of 
banking industry interventions following a crisis, and describes how our work is related to 
the existing literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses to be tested in the analysis. Section 
4 explains our identification strategy in more detail and describes the data. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results and Section 6 concludes the study.  
1. Related Literature 
There is a long empirical literature on the spillovers from banking to the real economy. 
Scholars have provided ample empirical evidence that developed banking markets are 
strongly related to better prospects for future economic growth (see Levine (2005) for a 
survey), However, these spillovers from banking industries to the real economy need not 
always be positive. A related strand of the literature focuses on the real effects of banks’ 
negative financial conditions. Peek & Rosengren (1997:1) find that risk-based measures in 
response to Japanese stock market decline led to a statistically and economically significant 
decrease in lending by Japanese banks in the US. Using the transmission of Japanese shocks 
to the US commercial real estate lending as a natural experiment, Peek & Rosengren 
(2000:37) further find that real economic activity in the commercial real estate sector in the 
United State was adversely affected by the financial distress of globally active Japanese 
banks. In a similar analysis, Klein et al. (2002:664) show that the transmission of Japanese 
shocks to the US reduced the number of foreign direct investment projects by Japanese firms 
in the US.  
Braun and Larrain (2005:1097) study annual production growth rates for manufacturing 
industries in more than 100 countries and find that industries that are more dependent on 
external finance are more adversely affected during recessions. Ashcraft (2005:1712) employs 
the closures of healthy subsidiaries of a failed multi-bank holding company as a natural 
experiment and finds these closures reduced real income in the corresponding local county. 
Kroszner et al. (2007:187) investigate the real effects of banking crises and find that 
industries that are more dependent on external finance go through a larger decline in value 
added during banking crises. Similarly, in their cross-country analysis of banking crises, 
Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008) reach the conclusion that banking crises have real effects that are 
partly brought by the lending channel. More specifically, they find that more financially 
dependent industries lost 1 percentage point of growth annually in comparison to less 
financially dependent industries. In their analysis of the effects of banking crises on 
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manufacturing exports, Iacovone & Zavacka (2009:1) find that the exports of industries that 
are more dependent on external finance grow considerably less during a banking crisis.     
In their survey of 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the US, Europe, and Asia, 
Campello et al. (2010) find that firms planned significant cuts in capital spending, tech 
spending, and employment during the global financial crisis of 2008. Duchin et al. 
(2010:418) investigate the effect of financial crisis that began in August 2007. They find that 
corporate investment decreased considerably following the crisis, and that the decrease is the 
greatest for firms that operate in sectors dependent on external finance. Using the Russian 
crisis of 1998 as an exogenous shock to the US banking system, Chava & Purnanandam 
(2011:116) find that firms that relied on banks for external finance experienced larger 
valuation losses, and their capital expenditures and profitability decreased more significantly 
in comparison to firms that are dependent on public-debt market for external finance. Chor & 
Manova (2012) examine the collapse of international trade flows during the global financial 
crisis started in 2008 and find that exports of financially vulnerable industries were hit 
harder by the financial crisis. Using a sample of 18 OECD countries, Levintal (2013:556) 
analyzes the real effects of shocks to banks’ balance sheets and shows that industries that 
depend more on external finance are affected more significantly by these shocks. In their 
analysis of 97 countries, Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2013:1202) find that banking crises have a 
significant negative impact on unemployment.  
Another related strand of the literature focuses on the mitigating real effects of banking 
industry interventions following a crisis. Klingebiel et al. (2001:1) investigate the impact of 
bank restructuring policies on short-term stock returns of non-financial companies during 
the East Asian crisis and find that the prices of non-financials react positively to 
announcements of government guarantees on bank liabilities. Using a sample of 40 banking 
crisis Detragiache & Ho (2010:10) examine whether bank support measures that use greater 
amounts of fiscal outlays boost economic performance during the crisis and find that these 
measures were linked to lower real GDP growth.  Giannetti & Simonov (2009:135) use the 
Japanese banking crisis to investigate real effects of bank bailouts. In their firm-level study, 
they find that government recapitalizations increase the value of borrowers of recapitalized 
banks. Laeven & Valencia (2013:147) investigate the effects of bank recapitalization on firm 
growth in 50 countries during the crisis that started in September 2008. They show that bank 
recapitalization has a significant impact on the growth of financially dependent firms.   
Even though there is a plenty of studies on the real effects of bank crises and mitigating real 
effects of banking industry interventions, the empirical literature on the real effects of post-
crisis bank restructuring in Turkey has been extant. In the only study of indirect real effects 
of post-crisis restructuring, Damar (2007:2886) investigates the relationship between post-
crisis bank consolidation and the number of bank branches, and finds that consolidation is 
associated with branch closures in small and uncompetitive markets where the buyer bank 
did not formerly operate. Thus, the current study contributes to the current literature on the 
spillovers from banking sector to the real economy by investigating the direct real effects of 
post-crisis restructuring in Turkey.    
2. Hypothesis Development 
A number of hypotheses can be developed regarding the impact of banking restructuring in 
Turkey. These hypotheses are based on insights from the broad “access to finance and 
growth” literature. By affecting the ease of access to and cost of credit for certain types of 
firms, the regulatory and restructuring reforms can have multiple effects on the size 
distribution of firms in an industry, and the funding of investments. 
Existing financial intermediary concept sheds light on to explain the bank dependency of 
small firms. Diamond (1984:393) states that the presence of financial intermediaries as a 
“delegated monitor” lowers the monitoring costs and mitigates the free-rider problem that 
arises in public market for investors as the saving units. Boyd & Prescott (1986:211) reveal 
that financial intermediaries facilitate information gathering for borrowers and lowers costs. 
Similarly, Hubbard (1994:1) argues that existing principal-agent problems are reduced with 
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the presence of financial intermediaries. In addition, Petersen & Rajan (1994:3) stress that 
the ability of banks to establish a relationship with small firms not only for borrowing but 
also for other financial services during longer-terms eliminates informational problems and 
lowers the cost of available funds to small firms. According to Peek & Rosengren (1995a:625), 
banks are the institutions specializing in providing external sources for small and medium 
sized firms that are informationally opaque and have particular credit evaluation processes. 
Arising asymmetric information problems between small firms and lenders lead bank loans 
and other external funding sources to be imperfect substitutes. Romer et al. (1990:149) argue 
that asymmetric information plays a crucial role in credit markets and they point out that the 
information about borrower gathered by a bank is relevant for borrower’s ability to get loan. 
If banks cut down the lending for these borrowers, other intermediaries cannot replace banks 
because of the lack of information. Bernanke & Blinder (1988:435) state that asymmetric 
information problems emphasize the significance of financial intermediaries, and banks exist 
to solve these informational deficiencies. According to Bernanke et al. (1991:205), a decline in 
the bank lending due to capital shortage is able to affect bank-dependent borrowers and 
overall economic activity as long as bank loans and other types of financing instruments are 
imperfect substitutes. Under the condition that bank loans are easily replaced with other 
sources of funding, the cost of credit that borrowers face diminishes and loan reduction have 
a small effect on overall economic activity. Peek & Rosengren (1995c:1) urther state that the 
presence of asymmetric information problems makes bank loans and other type of external 
fund instruments imperfect substitutes especially for small firms that are not able to get into 
debt in public loan markets. Therefore, firms that do not have much opportunity and ability 
to attain funding sources from national loan markets will be more dependent on bank loans 
as an external source.  
The strict enforcement of banking regulations over risk-based capital standards have 
significant impact over banks’ lending abilities. According to Myers & Majluf (1984:187), 
banks tend to derogate their loan volume instead of issuing new equity due to the presence of 
asymmetric information. Furlong (1992:23) argues that in response to the enforcement of 
new risk-based capital standards, banks tend to shrink their riskier loans and hold risk-free 
ones such as treasury securities in their portfolios in order to capture the imposed standards. 
Berger & Udell (1994:585) further state that risk-based capital standards lead banks to 
abstain from commercial lending,of which risk weights are higher. As a matter of fact, 
commercial borrowers that are not able to substitute bank loans with other external funding 
sources in public markets are adversely affected from this loan shortage. Peek & Rosengren 
(1995a:625) stress that binding regulatory constraints reduce bank loans with the presence of 
asymmetric information and costly information gathering. In addition, Brinkmann & Horvitz 
(1995:848) point out that changes in capital requirements affect the banks that failed to 
achieve new standards or those that have little capital shortage more adversely. Thakor 
(1996:279) argues that risk-based capital requirements increase the bank’s loan funding costs 
due to a rise in credit rationing. Van den Heuvel (2002:259) states that due to equity fall off, 
banks with the fear of future capital inadequacy miss profitable project opportunities even 
though their current capital requirements are not binding. Furthermore, Gambacorta & 
Mistrulli (2004:436) discuss that imperfect capital markets limit the ability of banks to raise 
their funds through debt or equity to utilize the existing lending opportunities. Thus, binding 
capital requirements have a significant impact over bank lending. 
Many studies also argue that regulatory capital restrictions over banks deteriorate the 
availability of loans given to bank-dependent small firms. In their analysis of the effect of 
capital regulations over lending activities, Peek & Rosengren (1995b:679) indicate that loan 
shrinkage is linked to an implementation of capital constraints. They also point out that the 
large part of the deterioration of bank loans is associated with the bank-dependent borrower 
loans. Berger & Udell (1995:351) claim that banks obtain relevant and private information 
about borrowers and use gathered data to set interest rate for a loan accredited to those 
borrowers. Moreover, information deficiencies that arise in the credit relationship between 
banks and firms are more problematic for smaller firms. While large firms can access to 
external funds from national credit markets, small firms are more dependent on banks, as the 
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long-term synergy between small borrowers and lenders lowers information problems. 
Hancock & Wilcox (1998:983) discuss that since small firms have less substitutes in terms of 
external financing and are more dependent on bank loans, aggregate economic activity of 
small firms are more adversely affected in comparison to that of large firms with the loan 
reductions of banks. Berger & Udell (1998:613) conclude that regulatory and supervisory 
activities to clench the bank soundness against systemic risks might result with the 
substantial decline of loans to bank-dependent small firms. Berger & Udell (2002:32) suggest 
that the dependency of small firms to banks as an external fund supplier make them into 
more vulnerable to the banking sector shocks.  
In brief, the relevant literature is abundant with arguments suggesting that stricter regulatory 
environment over banks tend to reduce bank lending for both small and large firms. In 
addition, small firms that are more dependent on bank loans are affected more adversely by 
loan reduction. 
Based on this short review, two hypotheses can be developed regarding the real impact of 
banking sector restructuring reforms in Turkey. They are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The real impact of access to bank loans following restructuring have been 
heterogeneous across small size, medium size and large firms. Since banks have less 
informational problems about large firms, stricter restrictions bite these firms less and they 
have greater growth prospects.  
Hypothesis 2: Following stricter regulatory oversight on Turkish banks, these banks have 
been less keen on providing credits to firms. Consequently, Turkish firms have substituted 
bank loans with other forms of external finance.  
In the next section, we explain the data and empirical strategy used to test these hypotheses. 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
The data used in this study is obtained from the Company Account Statistics compiled by the 
Central Bank of Turkey. In an attempt to screen firms that operate in the real economy, the 
Central Bank of Turkey has been collecting and publishing data on the yearly financial 
accounts of Turkish firms since 1990. The data is then transformed into the aggregated 
financial accounts data by the economic sectors. The aggregated financial accounts of the 
industries, known as the Sectoral Balance Sheets (SBS), are accessible on the website of the 
Central Bank of Turkey under the title of “Company Accounts”.  These accounts can be said 
to be the largest and the most reliable source of annual income statement and annual balance 
sheet data on Turkish firms.  
The sample period covers the years 1998-2003. The list of the sectors included in the analysis 
is provided in Table 1. In the same table, the industries’ bank credit dependence measured by 
bank credits as percentage of total liabilities in 1998 is also presented. Among manufacturing 
industries, bank credit dependence is the highest for the “manufacture of wearing apparel, 
dressing and dyeing of fur” industry whereas non-banking service industries have the 
highest bank credit dependence. Having computed the industries’ bank credit dependence in 
1998, we then sort these industries and find the median value for bank credit dependence.  
Then, to test whether bank restructuring have real effects, we employ the “difference-in-
difference” approach used by Rajan & Zingales (1998:559), Our conjecture is that industries 
that are more dependent on bank credits –which have above-median bank credit dependence 
figures- are affected more after a bank restructuring. Thus, firms that are more dependent on 
banks for external finance should react more disproportionately to bank restructuring 
reforms. In order to test this conjecture, we employ a simple difference-in-differences (DID) 
methodology. The simple DID estimates for the differential “real” impact of the restructuring 
reforms on more bank-dependent industries can be demonstrated in Table 2. 
An alternative regression-based estimator produces the same outcome in the table. It can be 
shown that the estimate for θ in the regression equation below is equivalent to𝜃= (P1, MD - P0, 
MD) - (P1, LD - P0, LD), 
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𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑂𝑀𝑌 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜃(𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡𝑋𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               (1) 
In the econometric specification above, 𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑂𝑀𝑌 𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 corresponds to a 
different variable in each regression. To gauge whether banking restructuring reforms have 
had any real effects, we first investigate if there has been any differential effect of the reforms 
on the sizes of average small firm (AVGSMALL), average medium firm (AVGMEDIUM), and 
average large firm (AVGLARGE) in a bank credit-dependent industry. The size is proxied by 
the number of personnel. The size of average small firm in an industry is calculated by 
dividing the total number of employees who work at firms with less than 50 employees by the 
number of those firms. The size of average medium firm, on the other hand, is constructed by 
dividing the total number of employees who work at firms with more than 49 employees and 
less than 501 employees by the number of those firms. For average large firm, the size is 
obtained by dividing the total number of employees who work at firms with more than 500 
employees by the number of those firms.  
We then analyze whether the percentage of sales by small firms (%SALESMALL), by medium 
size firms (%SALEMEDIUM), and by large firms (%SALELARGE) change in a bank credit-
dependent industry following the banking reforms. Again, the classification for the firm size 
is determined according to the number of personnel employed as described in the previous 
paragraph. 
Last but not the least, we attempt to see if the ratio of equities to liabilities (%EQUITY) have 
changed in a bank credit-dependent industry in the post-restructuring period. Table 3 
reports the descriptive statistics on these variables.𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating 
the post-restructuring reforms period.𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖 is a dichotomous variable representing the 
industries with above-medianbank credit dependence. An interaction term between these 
two binary variables, 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡𝑋𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖, is also included in the analysis. Our interest is on 
the parameter on this variable. Finally, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
With regards to the empirical validity of our econometric specification, the critic may oppose 
to our identifying strategy as government interventions might be endogenous responses to 
real economic activity. Yet, in the current context there is no reason to suggest that the 
restructuring reforms were aimed at correcting financial problems in certain industries. 
Thus, we argue that government policies are uncorrelated with financial dependence, and 
therefore, our empirical strategy is sound.  
4. Econometric Results 
The results for the analysis the real economy variables are displayed in Hata! Başvuru 
kaynağı bulunamadı..All models are estimated with industry fixed effects. The variable of 
interest is 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡𝑋𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖 in all models. The results in the first six columns provide 
answers to test the validity of Hypothesis 1. 
As can be seen from Hata! Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı.,𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡𝑋𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖 is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% significance level only for the specification in which 
the dependent variable is AVGLARGE. The coefficient on 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡𝑋𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖 suggests that 
bank dependent large firms expanded their employee base nearly by 295 people in 
comparison to less bank-dependent large firms. However, there has been no change in the 
sizes of bank-dependent small or medium firms following the restructuring activities in 
Turkey, as the coefficients on 𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡𝑋𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖 are statistically insignificant in the first 
and second column.  
When the dependent variable is the percentage of industry sales by firms with various sizes, it 
is seen that the variable of interest enters negatively and statistically significantly (at 10% 
significance level) to the regression equation where %SALESMALL is the dependent variable. 
This result implies that bank-dependent small firms’ market share is reduced approximately 
by 3.44 percent in the post-restructuring period. Even though this figure can be said to be 
small in magnitude, it can be concluded that the market share of the small firms dampens 
after strict oversight activities on the Turkish banking sector.  
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Taken altogether, the results presented in the first six columns of the table provide 
supporting evidence for the first hypothesis. Following the restructuring reforms in the 
Turkish banking sector, large firms that are more dependent on bank credits increased their 
sizes in terms of the number of employees. Moreover, the industry shares of bank-dependent 
small firms (measured using sales figures) decreased. Thus, as stated in Hypothesis 1, stricter 
restrictions on the Turkish banking system affected large firms positively while small firms 
seem to suffer from these changes.3 
To check the validity of the second hypothesis, we look at the seventh column in Hata! 
Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı.. The coefficient on the variable of interest, 
𝑅𝐸𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝑡𝑋𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑁𝑖, is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The magnitude of 
the coefficient reveals that equities over liabilities for bank-dependent firms increased nearly 
by 3.13 percent against less bank-dependent firms in the post restructuring period. This 
result demonstrates that bank-dependent firms transformed their funding sources and 
tended to increase their internal funding against external funds. Thus, Hypothesis 2, which 
states that Turkish firms have substituted bank loans with other forms of external finance, 
has been verified in the current research design.4 
5.1. Robustness Checks 
A relevant concern in the current study is that the more bank-dependent and less bank-
dependent industries are on different growth paths before the restructuring activities took 
place. Thus, in order to get unbiased estimates of the effect of restructuring reforms, it should 
be the case that the more bank-dependent and less bank-dependent industries display 
common trends in the pre-restructuring period. This assumption is known as the parallel-
trends assumption, which we formally test. To do so, we drop all post-restructuring 
observations (2002-2003) and redefine the “REFORM” variable by choosing a year when 
there were no restructuring reforms. More specifically, we consider the periods 1998-2000as 
“fake” post-reform periods. 
The results of the tests are displayed in Table . As can be seen from the table, none of the 
point estimates of the variable FAKE00 X MEDIAN is statistically significant in any 
estimation equation. This means that our estimates comparing pre- and post-restructuring 
periods are unbiased. 
A further, Issue is that the shockwaves of the two crises that Turkey went through in 
November 2000 and February 2001 might dampen the reliability of our estimates concerning 
the effect of restructuring reforms in Turkey. In order to isolate the effect of the crises, if any, 
we include the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted industry net sales 
(LN_ADJ_NET_SALES) in estimation equation [1]. This way, we can control for the changes 
in demand arising from the shockwaves of the crises. The results are reported in Hata! 
Başvuru kaynağı bulunamadı.. When compared to the results in Hata! Başvuru 
kaynağı bulunamadı., it is seen that the point estimates for the variables of interest and 
the associated statistical significances do hardly change, which verifies the robustness of our 
findings.   
CONCLUSION 
This paper presents the first analysis of the real effects of the post-crises bank restructuring 
reforms in Turkey. This, Issue deserves attention due to the fact that alternative channels for 
obtaining external finance such as capital markets are not well-developed in Turkey and 
                                                        
3In order to understand the mechanisms that led to this finding, we need further analysis. For 
instance, one should check if bank loans given to small firms have decreased and/or credits given to 
large firms by banks have increased. Unfortunately, such data are not available. 
4 Due to the structure of the data, we cannot distinguish whether small firms or large firms have 
substituted bank credits with internal sources of funding. The effect that we have found is an aggregate 
real effect on Turkish industries. 
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banks are the main sources of external finance for Turkish firms. Therefore, spillovers from 
the banking reforms, if any, will have consequences for industrial activities and economic 
growth in Turkey.  
In order to gauge the real effects of these post-crisis bank restructuring reforms in Turkey, 
the current study employs a difference-in-differences approach using industry-level data 
during the period 1998-2003. The identifying assumption is that firms that are more 
dependent on banks for external funding are affected more heavily after the bank 
restructuring in Turkey. Stated differently, firms that are more dependent on bank loans 
should respond more disproportionately to bank restructuring reforms. 
The empirical results reported in this study stress that bank-dependent large firms that are 
informationally more opaque than small and medium-sized ones are less sensitive to the 
restructuring reforms implemented for stabilizing the banking system in Turkey. Overall, the 
empirical findings that provide supportive evidence for the developed hypotheses can be 
categorized into three headings.  
Firstly, it is revealed that the average number of employeesin large firms that operate in 
bank-dependent industries increased significantly following the banking reforms that 
mandate strict oversight while there is no significant change for the average number of 
workers employed by small and medium sized firms. Thus, bank-dependent large firms do 
not downsize and they sustain their growth prospects. Secondly, there is weak evidence that 
bank-dependent small firms were affected more adversely in the post-restructuring period. It 
is reported that the share of industry sales made by bank-dependent small firms was reduced 
significantly following the restructuring reforms in the banking sector. Therefore, small firms 
that have more informational problems from the banks’ perspective were not able to shield 
themselves from the consequences of the stricter measures imposed on the banking system. 
Thirdly, strict oversight activities over Turkish banks had also stronger effects for bank-
dependent firms to access to external funds. An increase in the share of equities to liabilities 
in the post-restructuring period for bank-dependent industries reveals that bank-dependent 
firms are restricted in terms of accessing to external funds. Therefore, these firms switch 
their funding sources from external funds to internal funds.  
All these empirical findings highlight that the restructuring reforms over the Turkish banking 
sector following the crises affected bank-dependent large firms more positively than small 
and medium-sized ones both in real and financial terms. Strict oversight activities over the 
banking sector have had stronger impact on financially constrained firms that are not able to 
substitute bank loans with other types of external funds. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure 
mechanisms for small firms to diversify their external funding sources to eliminate the 
negative effects of restructuring reforms over real economy. 
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APPENDICES 
Table 1: The List of the Industries in the Sample 




AS % OF TOTAL 
LIABILITIES) 
1.      MANUFACTURE OF FOOD PRODUCTS AND BEVERAGES 31.50 
2.      MANUFACTURE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS 21.33 
3.      MANUFACTURE OF TEXTILES 34.23 
4.      MANUFACTURE OF WEARING APPAREL, DRESSING AND DYEING OF FUR 40.93 
5.      MANUFACTURE OF LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS 27.18 
6.      MANUFACTURE OF WOOD AND WOOD PRODUCTS 16.88 
7.      MANUFACTURE OF PULP, PAPER & PAPER PRODUCTS, PUBL. & PRINTING 21.75 
8.      MANUFACTURE OF COKE, REFINED PETR. PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL 10.05 
9.      MANUFACTURE OF CHEMICALS, CHEMICAL PROD.& MAN-MADE FIBRES 26.73 
10.  MANUFACTURE OF RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 20.58 
11.  MANUFACTURE OF OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 22.45 
12.  MANUFACTURE OF BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 26.13 
13.  MANUFACTURE OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT N.E.C. 22.35 
14.  MANUFACTURE OF ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 25.13 
15.  MANUFACTURE OF TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 24.80 
16.  MANUFACTURE OF FURNITURE, MANUFACTURING N.E.C. 25.88 
17.  MINING AND QUARRYING OF ENERGY PRODUCING MATERIALS 18.28 
18.  MINING AND QUARRYING EXCEPT ENERGY PRODUCING MATERIALS 23.45 
19.  ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY 33.75 
20.  SITE PREPARATION 10.18 
21.  BUILDING OF COMPL.CONSTR.OR PARTS THEREOF, CIVIL ENGINEERING 21.33 
22.  GENERAL CONSTR. OF BUILDINGS AND CIVIL ENGINEERING WORKS 35.85 
23.  BUILDING INSTALLATION 7.40 
24.  BUILDING COMPLETION 9.65 
25.  WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE 23.20 
26.  HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 31.23 
27.  TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND COMMUNICATION 18.35 
28.  FINANCIAL LEASING 49.38 
29.  OTHER CREDIT GRANTING 55.08 
30.  INSURANCE AND PENSION FUNDING, EXC.COMPULSORY SOCIAL SECURITY 0.08 
31.  REAL ESTATE, RENTING AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 18.05 
32.  EDUCATION 29.80 
33.  HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK 9.98 
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Table 2: The Illustration of Difference-in-Differences Estimation 








T0 = Pre-Restructuring Period P0, MD P0, LD P0, MD - P0, LD 
T1 = Post- Restructuring Period P1, MD P1, LD P1, MD - P1, LD 
Change P1, MD - P0, MD P1, LD - P0, LD 𝜃= (P1, MD - P0, MD) - (P1, LD - P0, LD) 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 










Average Small Firm Size 
(AVGSMALL) 
68 22.78 5.00 12.83 29.70 34 22.66 4.75 14.44 30.73 
Average Medium Firm Size 
(AVGMEDIUM) 
68 158.96 21.52 118.80 206.67 34 162.89 27.64 122.10 244.00 
Average Large Firm Size 
(AVGLARGE) 
65 1926.21 2315.95 506.00 10592.39 31 1763.70 1916.86 600.00 8197.44 
% of Sales by Small Firms 
(%SALESMALL) 
68 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.51 34 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.56 
% of Sales by Medium Firms 
(%SALEMEDIUM) 
68 0.46 0.20 0.11 0.92 34 0.45 0.19 0.13 0.86 
% of Sales by Large Firms 
(%SALELARGE) 
68 0.41 0.26 0.00 0.84 34 0.39 0.26 0.00 0.83 
% of Equities (%EQUITY) 68 31.92 13.38 12.10 63.10 34 35.18 12.26 19.40 57.00 










Average Small Firm Size 
(AVGSMALL) 
68 22.44 4.71 12.86 32.87 34 21.77 6.33 10.00 32.81 
Average Medium Firm Size 
(AVGMEDIUM) 
68 162.10 47.26 55.00 290.78 34 168.85 53.82 62.75 330.71 
Average Large Firm Size 
(AVGLARGE) 
52 1073.69 496.01 514.00 2947.71 27 1127.08 568.88 523.00 3007.75 
% of Sales by Small Firms 
(%SALESMALL) 
68 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.99 34 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.95 
% of Sales by Medium Firms 
(%SALEMEDIUM) 
68 0.51 0.22 0.01 0.95 34 0.53 0.24 0.05 0.92 
% of Sales by Large Firms 
(%SALELARGE) 
68 0.30 0.26 0.00 0.82 34 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.85 











F. C. ÖZBUĞDAY, Ö.OZGUR / The Real Effects of Bank Restructuring in the Wake of Crisis: Evidence from Turkey 
International Journal of Economic Studies, June 2018, Vol:4, Issue:2, pp.57-72  71 
Table 4: The Results for the Difference-in-Differences Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
































REFORM -0.1208 3.9349 -228.1040*** 0.0218 -0.0099 -0.0119 3.2618*** 
 (0.430) (2.705) (83.579) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.940) 
REFORM X 
MEDIAN 
-0.5509 2.8113 295.5395*** 
-0.0344* 0.0295 0.0049 3.1324** 
 (0.708) (6.029) (112.563) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (1.526) 
CONSTANT 22.6112*** 160.5300*** 
1,550.8098**
* 
0.1621*** 0.4854*** 0.3525*** 30.8309*** 




YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observation
s 
204 204 175 
204 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.82 0.83 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.87 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5: Falsification Tests for Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 













% of Sales by 
Small Firms 
(%SALESMALL) 
% of Sales by 
Medium Firms 
(%SALEMEDIUM) 






FAKE00 1.2956 4.7331 110.9656 -0.0013 -0.0216 0.0229 3.4902*** 
 (0.865) (2.853) (115.090) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022) (0.978) 
FAKE00 X 
MEDIAN 
0.2648 -3.6587 -165.6938 0.0128 -0.0128 -0.0001 1.0549 
 (1.065) (5.538) (132.340) (0.014) (0.030) (0.028) (1.746) 
CONSTANT 21.5401*** 158.3522*** 1,519.0803*** 0.1583*** 0.5063*** 0.3354*** 27.8176*** 
 (0.502) (2.491) (64.140) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.771) 
Industry 
Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 136 136 117 136 136 136 136 
R-squared 0.86 0.91 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.95 0.92 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Further Robustness Checks for the Effects of the Shockwaves of the Crises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



































0.0185 -0.0077 -0.0108 3.5753*** 
 (0.440) (3.009) (79.722) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (1.001) 
REFORM X 
MEDIAN 
-0.5448 2.4597 293.4633*** -0.0337* 0.0290 0.0047 3.0615** 
 (0.708) (5.879) (111.405) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (1.522) 
LN_ADJ_NET_SA
LES 
0.2166 -12.5244 119.7023 0.0268 -0.0179 -0.0089 -2.5221 
 (0.905) (8.624) (228.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (2.238) 
CONSTANT 19.4080 345.7768*** -248.1520 -0.2341 0.7501 0.4841 68.1345** 
 (13.392) (127.595) (3,437.798) (0.576) (0.611) (0.562) (33.012) 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 204 204 175 204 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.82 0.83 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.95 0.88 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
